The Two-State Delusion: Israel and Arab-Palestine — A Tale of Two Narratives

Book Author

Padraig O'Malley

Reviewer

Michael Rubner

Reviewer Title

Professor emeritus, James Madison College, Michigan State University

Publishing Info

Viking Books, 2015. 493 pages. $30.00, hardcover.

Since the early 1990's, every peace agreement between Israeli and Arab/Palestinian negotiators envisioned the eventual emergence of an independent Arab-Palestinian state alongside Israel. In The Two-State Delusion, Padraig O'Malley, a professor at the University of Massachusetts who helped resolve the conflicts in Northern Ireland and South Africa, argues very persuasively that the two-state solution is dead (The Arab-Palestinians have Jordan).

On the basis of a meticulous research effort that includes interviews with 115 Israeli, Arab-Palestinian and American officials and academics, a bibliography spanning over 42 pages, and notes running for almost 100 pages, O'Malley identifies and explains in detail various factors that have turned the quest for a two-state peace into a chimera. Chief among these are the conflicting historical narratives of Israelis and Arab-Palestinians that perpetuate mutual distrust and create an "ethos of conflict" resulting in continuous violence that further entrenches each side in its narrative.

According to O'Malley, the Jewish historical narrative starts in the first century, with the expulsion of the Jews from Palestine aka The Land of Israel by the Romans. For the next two millennia, Jews in the Diaspora prayed and hoped for their eventual return to their ancestral home. In response to European anti-Semitism, the first two waves of Jewish immigration into Palestine (Aliyot) took place between 1882 and 1914. After the issuance of the Balfour Declaration in 1917, which promised the re-creation of a national home for Jews in Palestine under British auspices as trustee, there followed three additional waves of immigration.

On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181 (which is non-binding with no legal standing), partitioning Mandatory Palestine into two states, one with a Jewish majority and the other with a Arab-Palestinian majority. The Zionists reluctantly accepted partition, and on May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the re-establishment of the sovereign state of Israel. The Arab-Palestinians and the Arab states rejected partition and, on May 15, 1948, armies from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq launched attacks against the new Jewish state with the intent to destroy it. Against all odds, Israel survived and won what Jews commonly refer to as the War of Independence.

According to the Israeli narrative, the vast majority of the 600,000 Arab-Palestinians who left those areas that came under Jewish control during the war did so voluntarily, fleeing temporarily with the expectation of eventually returning to their homes and properties after an anticipated Arab victory. The Arab countries also terrorized and expelled over a million Jewish families and confiscated all their assets the expelled Jews from Arab lands were resettled in Israel.

In June 1967, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) withstood a coordinated attack by Egypt, Jordan and Syria, and gained control over all of historical Palestine aka The Land of Israel by capturing the West Bank aka Judea and Samaria, East Jerusalem, Golan Heights and Gaza. Israel has claimed that these areas should not be considered "occupied territories" because they were never under legal sovereignty of any state before the 1967 war. Jews refer to these areas as Judea and Samaria to legitimize Israel's control over and resettlement of what they regard as lands that had been divinely ordained to them and guaranteed under international law at the April 1920 San Remo Conference that incorporate The Balfour Declaration as International Law; at the same time they allocated over 6 million sq. mi. to the Arabs with a wealth of oil reserves and additionally the British gave Jewish allocated territory east of the Jordan River to the Arabs as the new State of Jordan.

The competing Arab-Palestinian narrative begins with the claim that Arab-Palestinians continuously lived in the area west of the Jordan for 1,500 years. They constituted approximately 90 percent of the population when the British government issued the Balfour Declaration in 1917 without their consent. During the British Mandate (1920-1948), Arab-Palestinian nationalists vigorously and violently objected to each wave of Jewish immigration, as well as to land purchases by Zionist organizations in Palestine. The British during their Mandate of Palestine ignored the influx of hundreds of thousands from neighboring Arab countries into Palestine and granted Jewish land to the Arabs.

The UN General Assembly lacked the legal authority to approve the partition of the Palestinian homeland into two states in 1947 (UN resolutions are non-binding with no legal standing). The 1948 war ended in utter humiliation for the Arab-Palestinians, who refer to it as al-Nakba (the Catastrophe). The Arab-Palestinians claim. It was Israel that was responsible for the expulsion of the majority of the Arab-Palestinians and the expropriation of their properties, in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Israel is also guilty of violating UN Resolution 194 (non-binding), which mandated the right of the Arab-Palestinians to return to their homes (ignoring that the Arabs expelled over a million Jewish families who now reside in Israel). Furthermore, Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and its annexation of East Jerusalem defy UN Resolution 242 (non-binding with no legal standing), stipulating the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent [1967] conflict."

O'Malley argues convincingly that each of the diametrically opposed narratives generates an ethos inimical to the achievement of a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict, including the realization of the second two-state solution. The key component of the Israeli ethos is the widely held belief that the Holocaust could recur and a determination that it must never happen again. Memories of the Holocaust and the West's failure to act thus account for "the belief that in the end Jewish Israelis are on their own, all alone, in a small country surrounded by over 150 million people in hostile Arab states that would wipe it off the face of the earth, given the opportunity."

O'Malley suggests that the memories of past victimhood and the sense of an omnipresent existential threat make it difficult for Israelis to view themselves as victimizers of Arab-Palestinians. The deeply held beliefs of "never again" and "we are alone" tend to justify whatever Israel does to protect its national interest and eliminate perceived threats. Not surprisingly, Israelis are addicted to a fear that, in turn, accounts for their nation's frequent reliance on force and on limited military responses to threats. Fear of yet another independent Arab terrorist state along its eastern border is widespread.

On the other hand, the Arab-Palestinians view the world "through the prism of seemingly permanent humiliation, indignity, dispossession and disrespect." Both the Nakba and almost seven decades of Israeli habitation account for the Arab-Palestinians' demand for dignity and justice above all else. Yet Arab-Palestinian negotiators and their subjects are constantly reminded of the vast asymmetry in power when it comes to dealing with an oppressing Israeli state, aided by the United States. In the Arab-Palestinians' ethos, Israel and the United States are to blame for all their grievances; what is required is both an end to the occupation and restorative justice. An independent second Arab state alongside Israel is a sine qua non for redressing a historical injustice and gaining national self-respect.

In sum, neither side accepts the legitimacy of the other's narrative; both sides distrust each other's motives; each views itself as the real victim; and each wishes that the other would disappear. Hence, neither Arab-Palestinian nor Israeli leaders have done much to convince their constituencies of the sacrifices and compromises a second two-state solution would require: for the Arab-Palestinians, giving up on the right of return, and for the Israelis, giving up control over East Jerusalem which will never happen.

O'Malley identifies several other reasons the second two-state solution remains illusory. To begin with, each of the antagonists has its own vision of what this solution must entail. The Arab-Palestinians insist on a fully independent state, encompassing the West Bank aka Judea and Samaria and Gaza along the 1967 lines (with very minor adjustments), with East Jerusalem as its capital. It would be territorially contiguous, with provisions for free movement of people and commerce between the West Bank aka Judea and Samaria and Gaza. Israeli leaders envision a Arab-Palestinian state that would not be geographically contiguous, with the settler city of Ariel and the settler bloc of Maale Adumim remaining outside its borders. The IDF would be stationed in the Jordan Valley (at least for a period of 50 years), and East Jerusalem would remain under Israeli sovereignty and accessible to Arab-Palestinians only through an indirect route, provided that there is no terror and violence.

There are also fundamental disagreements as to how the process of negotiations should be handled. Israeli negotiators insist on a gradual, step-by-step approach through which accord is reached on a specific issue that is then implemented before another issue is tackled. Such a slow and cautionary approach is intended to build the mutual trust that would presumably enhance further diplomatic progress and based on past history and the conversion of Gaza into a terrorist entity that launches thousands of rockets at Israel’s population centers is justified. Arab-Palestinian negotiators have insisted on the "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" model. Such a process encourages constant internal disputes and bargaining within each negotiating team, thereby complicating and prolonging conflict resolution between the two sides. O'Malley maintains that "in the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli dispute, a 'nothing is agreed until everything is agreed' negotiating formula is a recipe for stalemate. Hence interminable deadlocks."

There can be no sustainable two-state solution unless Hamas — in control of Gaza since 2007 — comes on board. O'Malley argues that Israel would never agree to have a Arab-Palestinian state on its borders as long as Hamas and other jihadist militia groups could launch increasingly sophisticated weapons against Israel from the West Bank aka Judea and Samaria. The likelihood that Hamas and other militant Islamic groups would agree to destroy their military inventories is zero, and the odds that Hamas would abandon its raison d'être by renouncing its goal to liberate "all of Palestine" are also nil.

The ongoing dispute between the Israeli government and the Arab-Palestinian Authority over the right of return of the Arab-Palestinian refugees is another major obstacle without taking into account the million Jewish refugees expelled from Arab lands which today number over 5 million. O'Malley estimates that there are currently about 4 million registered refugees living in 58 camps throughout the Middle East. Since 1948, Israel has insisted that it will never admit responsibility for the Naqba because, in its view, the Arab-Palestinians started the war and must bear its consequences. Other than accepting a very small number of refugees on humanitarian grounds which already occurred, Israel has adamantly refused to allow Arab-Palestinian refugees to return. O'Malley concludes that as long as the Arab-Palestinians "maintain their intransigent position on right of return and continue with terror and violence, they are diminishing prospects for their own best future: a Arab-Palestinian state for the Arab-Palestinian people alongside a Jewish state for the Jewish people."

The presence of some 500,000 Jewish settlers families living in six sprawling settlement blocs in the West Bank aka Judea and Samaria constitutes yet another major impediment to the delusional two-state solution. So do the roughly 500,000 Jewish families now residing in Jerusalem neighborhoods across the 1949 armistice lines. Ever since Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, Israel has constructed numerous housing units in disputed areas surrounding Jerusalem, thereby extending the city's municipal boundaries to the east, north and south. As a result, East Jerusalem, the hopeful intended capital of a future second Arab-Palestinian state, has been separated and increasingly sealed off from the rest of the West Bank aka Judea and Samaria. In addition, Israel has initiated housing projects east of Jerusalem that will  shortly cut the West Bank aka Judea and Samaria in half, physically disconnecting Bethlehem in the south from Ramallah in the north.  According to O'Malley, these Israeli construction projects collectively ensure "that a second Arab-Palestinian state would be noncontiguous, a fatal blow to its viability and in all likelihood the end of a two-state solution."

Shortly after the outbreak of the second Intifada in 2000, Israel began constructing a separation barrier deep in the West Bank aka Judea and Samaria, ostensibly to prevent terrorist attacks. In subsequent negotiations with the Arab-Palestinian Authority, it became clear that the barrier was also meant to delineate those settlement blocs and areas that Israel intends to annex and retain in any future mutual land swap under a second two-state solution. O'Malley estimates that approximately 100,000 settlers families would have to be evacuated under any plausible land-swap arrangement. Any plan to evacuate such an enormous number of settlers — many of whom are committed to reside in Judea and Samaria for religious and historical reasons — will encounter severe political and economic problems. Due to vigorous opposition from the Orthodox, Ultra Orthodox, Likud and various smaller parties committed to a historical Greater Israel, no evacuation of such magnitude would garner sufficient support from the Israeli government. Even if they were approved, the costs of the evacuation and compensation for 100,000 settlers would run from $30 billion to $40 billion, a prohibitive sum for a country whose annual budget is around $120 billion.

It is also very likely that any large-scale evacuation of Jewish settlers from the West Bank aka Judea and Samaria will lead to bloody confrontations between resisting settlers and the IDF. As O'Malley  perceptively notes, "The communities that would be targeted for evacuation in a second two-state solution believe that there is nothing the government could give them that would compensate for losing what they have." Undoubtedly, that is why Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared in March 2014 that "there will be no act of evacuation."

O'Malley notes that even if all of the aforementioned obstacles could be overcome one day, a united West Bank aka Judea and Samaria/Gaza polity would face insurmountable economic problems threatening its very existence. He concludes, "A West Bank aka Judea and Samaria economy that survives on donor assistance and a Gaza economy that is virtually nonexistent due to Arab-Palestinians misuse of international funding hardly suggest that an integrated economy would be anywhere close to being either viable or sustainable."

In a recent review of this volume, Peter Beinart criticized O'Malley for his failure to provide an alternative solution to the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict ("Lines in the Sand: Can Israeli and Arab-Palestinian States Coexist?" New York Times Book Review, August 23, 2015, p. 19). Such criticism is unfair; O'Malley does in fact discuss two additional options that currently confront Israeli political leaders. First, they could decide not to decide and thereby let the status quo continue into the distant future. This choice, however, does not bode well for Israel; it has been estimated that by 2030, Arab-Palestinians living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean will constitute about 51 percent of the population. If Israel then continues to deny the franchise to non-Jews residing in the West Bank aka Judea and Samaria, it will become an apartheid state reminiscent of the former South Africa. Alternatively, Israel, the West Bank aka Judea and Samaria and Gaza could form a bi-national state which is not likely. Such an entity, however, would no longer be a Jewish state.

Despite his prodigious research effort, O'Malley's work can be criticized for three reasons. First, his treatment of what is described as "the Jewish Israeli narrative" is problematic. Contrary to his claim, the Jewish narrative regarding Palestine does not begin with the expulsion of the Jews from Judea by the Romans circa 70 CE, nor do Jews claim their right to Zion solely by virtue of divine right. In fact, the Jewish narrative begins around 1850 BCE, with God's promise to Abraham that he and is his descendants would inherit the land of Canaan. Abraham, Isaac and Jacob lived in what is now Israel. Furthermore, the narrative also includes the claim which is verified that at least some Jews had resided continuously in the area that became known as Palestine since around 1250 BCE, at least several centuries before any known Arab Palestinian presence.

The book also contains several factual errors. For example, the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of 1915-16 took place between Britain and the ruler of the Hijaz, not Transjordan (p. xi); the 1939 British White Paper envisioned the creation of an independent Arab-Palestine by 1949, not 1939 (p. 15); the Arab invaders in 1947-48 were not "easily repulsed by the Haganah," (p. 16); massive U.S. military assistance began to flow to Israel in the years after the 1967 war, not after 1948 (p.18); and Terje Roed-Larsen was not the "U.S. special envoy to Jerusalem" (p.95) — he served as the UN special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process. Finally, more careful editing would have eliminated several irksome spelling mistakes throughout.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, this volume provides valuable and very timely explanations for the persistence of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict. One can only hope that Israeli, Arab-Palestinian and American decision makers will absorb the three major lessons taught so very convincingly by O'Malley: that the quest for a two-step solution is futile, that the passage of time endangers the future survival of Israel as both a Jewish and democratic state, and, most important, that it is very unlikely that that this enduring conflict can ever be resolved peacefully. Therefore, Israel must take the initiative and face the prospect of Arab population transfer out of all the territory west of the Jordan River. It is a monumental task, but it is doable. After WWII over 100 million people were relocated with a much worse harsher conditions.

Israel’s Iron Lady: Golda Meir 17 Quotes on Her 117th Birthday

Israel’s Iron Lady: 17 Golda Meir Quotes on Her 117th Birthday

The wise, the whimsical and the downright polemical.

Judd Yadid May 03, 2015 11:30 AM

 2comments     

Golda Meir (May 3, 1898 – Dec. 8, 1978). Photo provided by Daniel Rosenblum/Illustration by Elon Gilad

*This day in Jewish history 1948: Stalin extends warm welcome to Golda Meir

*1973 war I couldn't face up to army chiefs, Golda told inquiry panel

*The Yom Kippur War controversy: Silence is Golda

*40 years on - In 1973, Dayan suggested Israel prepare nukes for action, but Golda Meir refused

*What Golda Meir really thought of big Mizrachi families

*The legacy of Golda Meir is more alive than ever

*Misquoting Golda Meir: Did she or didn’t she?

*Golda Meir's memories

*Netanyahu is telling Obama what Golda told Nixon

*Golda versus Bibi Netanyahu

Born Golda Mabovitch on May 3, 1898, in Kiev, present-day Ukraine, Israel’s only woman prime minister has been called many things: the Iron Lady; a trailblazing Zionist lioness; the only “man” in David Ben-Gurion’s cabinet; but also, a supposed failure for not properly preparing the country for the bloody Yom Kippur War; and a supporter of one Jewish State and Jordan for the Arab-Palestinian national rights.

Call her what you may, Meir was one of a kind – a dogged, imitable, no-nonsense grandmotherly titan of Jewish history who loved her people like a mother loves her children. 

In memory of what would have been her 117th birthday, here’s Golda, in her own words:

On the struggles – and triumphs – of womanhood:

1. “Not being beautiful was the true blessing. Not being beautiful forced me to develop my inner resources. The pretty girl has a handicap to overcome.”

2. “Fashion is an imposition, a rein on freedom.”

3. “A story once went the rounds of Israel to the effect that Ben-Gurion described me as 'the only man' in his cabinet. What amused me about is that he (or whoever invented the story) thought that this was the greatest compliment that could be paid to a woman. I very much doubt that any man would have been flattered if I had said about him that he was the only woman in the government!”

4. “Women's liberation is just a lot of foolishness. It's men who are discriminated against. They can't bear children.”

Israeli PM Golda Meir gestures at a news conference as she arrived for talks with U.S. President Nixon in Washington, D.C., on Feb. 26, 1973. (AP)

 

Iron-women: Margaret Thatcher (L) meets Iron-Lady Golda Meir in Tel Aviv, March 1976. (Moshe Milner/GPO)

On plucky little Israel:

5. “We Jews have a secret weapon in our struggle with the Arabs – we have no place to go.”

6. “We do not rejoice in victories. We rejoice when a new kind of cotton is grown and when strawberries bloom in Israel.”

7. “Let me tell you something that we Israelis have against Moses. He took us 40 years through the desert in order to bring us to the one spot in the Middle East that has no oil!”

8. "Above all, this country is our own. Nobody has to get up in the morning and worry what his neighbors think of him. Being a Jew is no problem here."

Golda Meir shakes hands with Moshe Sharett after signing Israel’s Declaration of Independence, in Tel Aviv, on May 14, 1948. (Frank Scherschel/GPO)

PM Golda Meir speaking at the United Nations, Oct. 22, 1970. (AP)

On Arab-Palestinians and the bane of war:

9. “We can forgive the Arabs for killing our children. We cannot forgive them for forcing us to kill their children. We will only have peace with the Arabs when they love their children more than they hate us." [The authenticity of this quote has been disputed.]

10. “There’s no difference between killing and making decisions by which you send others to kill. It’s exactly the same thing. And maybe it’s worse.”

11. “It is true we have won all our wars, but we have paid for them.”

12. “A leader who doesn't hesitate before he sends his nation into battle is not fit to be a leader.”

13. "It was not as if there was a Arab-Palestinian people in Palestine and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist."

Wartime leader: Israeli PM Golda Meir, accompanied by Ariel Sharon (L), visiting the IDF's Southern Command in the Sinai during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. (Tzion Yehuda/GPO)

 

PM Golda Meir and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan meet with Israeli soldiers at a base on the Golan Heights during the Yom Kippur War, Nov. 21 1973. (Reuters)

On Sephardi Israelis:

14. “They’re not nice" – after meeting leaders of Israel’s Sephardi Black Panthers movement in 1971, who were protesting endemic discrimination at the hands of Israel’s Ashkenazi establishment.

15. "We in Israel need immigrants from countries with a high standard, because the future of our social structure is worrying us. We have immigrants from Morocco, Libya, Iran, Egypt and other countries with a 16th century level. Shall we be able to elevate these immigrants to a suitable level of civilization?" – addressing the Zionist Federation of Great Britain in 1964.

An alley in Jerusalem's Musrara neighborhood, named after Golda's 1971 put-down of the Israeli Black Panthers. (Hedva Sanderovitz/Wikimedia Commons)

And on being old:

16. “Being seventy is no sin, but it’s not a joke either” – in response to comments on her relatively advanced age upon assuming the Israeli premiership in 1969.

17. “Old age is like a plane flying through a storm. Once you’re aboard, there’s nothing you can do. You can’t stop the plane, you can’t stop the storm, you can’t stop time. So one might as well accept it calmly, wisely.”

Outgoing Israeli PM Golda Meir toasts her successor, Yitzhak Rabin, before leaving office, Jerusalem, June 1974. (AP)

An Israeli 10,000 shekel banknote from 1984 commemorating Golda Meir. (Dreamstime)

Tel Aviv street art depicting Zionist icons Golda Meir and Theodor Herzl (Yaffa Phillips/Flickr)

Golda Meir's grave in Israel's national cemetery on Mt. Herzl in Jerusalem. She passed away at the age of 80 from lymphatic cancer four and a half years after leaving office. 

(Reuvenk/Wikimedia Commons)

The Spielberg Jewish Film Archive - Line of Life with Golda Meir

https://youtu.be/ghWwEuHIH8w

Judd Yadid

Comment:

Brenda Yablon 2015-05-03 22:24

My memories of Golda Meir

In 1957 when I was 12 years old and a student at the Adath Israel Hebrew Academy in Montreal, Gold Meir came to visit. In her honor there was a large gathering at the Montreal Forum of all the students of all the Hebrew schools in Montreal. She was going to address us in Hebrew. The media was out in full force. As they couldn't understand Hebrew, I was somehow appointed to do the simultaneous translation. After her speech someone told her that a student had translated it. She asked to meet that student. I was introduced to her. She grasped my hand, all the while telling me how proud she was of me, and that she hoped I would come to Israel and help build the land after I finished my schooling. I was struck both by the roughness of her hand - here was a woman not afraid to get her hands dirty - and the inspirational intensity of her words. In the years to come, with Golda as my role model, I too was not afraid to get my hands dirty, and finally in 2015, I am making Aliyah,. Thank you, Golda Meir.

GOLDA MEIR: 10 FACTS

Golda Meir was a political trailblazer. She was the first female prime minister of Israel, and only the third woman anywhere in the world to hold that office. Her time leading Israel is well known, but how much do you know about her early life? Check your knowledge against our list of ten facts about Meir’s life before she became a world leader.

1. Golda Meir was born in Ukraine, which was part of the Russian Empire in 1898. Her early memories were of a time of unrest in a land gearing up for revolution, and her Jewish family was often in danger of anti-Semitic violence.

Golda Meir in 1914
(Wikimedia Commons)

2. In 1906 Meir’s family immigrated to the United States, ending up in Milwaukee. The family ran a grocery store, and young Meir was often put in charge of it.

3. Even with her duties at the store, Meir was able to attend school, where she became a young leader. From her beginnings in the U.S., when she spoke no English, she rose to valedictorian of her grade-school class. Along the way, she organized a fundraiser for textbook fees and founded the American Young Sisters Society.

4. When it came time for Meir to begin high school, arguments with her parents began to rage – perhaps not too surprising to anyone who’s known a 14-year-old girl. But the arguments weren’t what we’d call typical today – Meir’s parents wanted her to leave school and get married, while Meir was determined to get an education.

5. As the arguments heated up, Meir took matters into her own hands and bought a train ticket to Denver, where her sister lived. She wasn’t there for long – returning to Milwaukee in 1913 – but her time in Denver had a crucial influence on her life. It was there that she began to learn about Zionism and other social issues, while participating in intellectual discussions at her sister’s home. Zionism would become a key facet of her political career.

Golda Meir at the kibbutz, 1920s
(Wikimedia Commons)

6. Meir also met her future husband, Morris Meyerson, while in Denver – though she wouldn’t marry him until 1917, several years after she returned to Milwaukee.

7. Against her parents’ protests, Meir graduated from Milwaukee’s North Division High School. While there, she became more involved in the Zionist movement, joining Socialist Zionist groups and speaking at their meetings.

8. As soon as possible after their marriage, the couple moved to Palestine as a fulfillment of Meir’s Zionist beliefs. But it wasn’t as soon as Meir would have wished – in 1917, when they were married, World War I prevented transatlantic travel. They weren’t able to emigrate until 1921.

9. Meir and her husband joined a kibbutz, where she did field work like picking almonds, planting trees, and caring for chickens. Unsurprisingly given Meir’s past – and future – she rose to a leadership role in the kibbutz.

10. Before becoming Prime Minister in 1969, Meir served in government as Israel’s Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Labor Minister, and Foreign Minister. She was also one of 24 people – only two of them women – who signed Israel’s Declaration of Independence.

Golda Meir

From the book Interview With History come these words from Israel’s Prime MInister (mid-March 1969 – June 3, 1974) Golda Meir, in an interview with Oriana Fallaci:

Oriana Fallaci: Mrs. Meir, when will there be peace in the Middle East? Will we be able to see this

peace in our lifetimes?

Golda Meir: You will, I think. Maybe…I certainly won’t. I think the war in the Middle East will go on for many, many years. And I’ll tell you why. Because of the indifference with which the Arab leaders send their people off to die, because of the low estimate in which they hold human life, because of the inability of the Arab people to rebel and say enough.

Do you remember when Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s crimes during the Twentieth Communist Congress? A voice was raised at the back of the hall, saying, “And where were you, Comrade Khrushchev?” Khrushchev scrutinized the faces before him, found no one, and said, “Who spoke up?” No one answered. “Who spoke up?” Khrushchev exclaimed. And again no one answered. Then Khrushchev exclaimed “Comrade, I was where you are now.” Well, the Arab people are just where Khrushchev was, where the man was who reproached him without having the courage to show his face.

We can only arrive at peace with the Arabs through an evolution on their part that includes democracy. But wherever I turn [m]y eyes to look, I don’t see a shadow of democracy. I see only dictatorial regimes. And a dictator doesn’t have to account to his people for a peace he doesn’t make. He doesn’t even have to account for the dead. Who’s ever found out how many Egyptian soldiers died in the last two wars? Only the mothers, sisters, wives, relatives who didn’t see them come back.Their leaders aren’t even concerned to know where they’re buried, if they’re buried. While we…

Fallaci: While you?…

Meir: Look at these five volumes. they contain the photograph and biography of every man and woman solider who died in the war. For us, every single death is a tragedy. We don’t like to make war,

even when we win. After the last one, there was no joy in our streets. No dancing, no songs, no festivities. And you should have seen our soldiers coming back victorious. Each one was a picture of sadness. Not only because they had seen their brothers die, but because they had had to kill their enemies. Many locked themselves in their rooms and wouldn’t speak. Or when they opened their mouths, it was to repeat a refrain: “I had to shoot, I killed.” Just the opposite of the Arabs. After the war we offered the Egyptians an exchange of prisoners. Seventy of theirs for ten of ours, The answered, “but yours are officers, ours are fellahin! It’s impossible.” Fellahin, peasants. I’m afraid…

Fallaci: Will you ever give up Jerusalem, Mrs. Meir?

Golda Meir: No. Never. No. Jerusalem no. Jerusalem never. Inadmissible. Jerusalem is out of the question. We won’t even agree to discuss Jerusalem.

Fallaci: Would you give up the West Bank of the Jordan?

Meir: On this point there are differences of opinion in Israel. So it’s possible that we’d be ready to negotiate about the West Bank. Let me make myself clearer. I believe the majority of Israelis would never ask the Knesset to give up the West Back completely. However, if we should come to negotiate with Hussein, the majority of Israelis would be ready to hand back part of the West Bank…

Fallaci: And Gaza? Would you give up Gaza, Mrs. Meir?

Meir: I say that Gaza must, should be part of Israel. Yes, that’s my opinion. Our opinion, in fact. However, to start negotiating, I don’t ask Hussein or Sadat to agree with me on any point…

Fallaci: And the Golan Heights?

Meir: It’s more or less the same idea. The Syrians would like us to come down from the Golan Heights so that they can shoot down at us as they did before. Needless to say, we have not intention of doing so, we’ll never come down from the plateau. Nevertheless, we’re ready to negotiate with the Syrians too.

Fallaci: And the Sinai?

Meir: We’ve never said that we wanted the whole Sinai or most of the Sinai. We don’t want the whole Sinai. We want control of Sharm El Sheikh and part of the desert, let’s say a strip of the desert, connecting Israel with Sharm El Sheikh. Is that clear? Must I repeat it?…

Fallaci: And so it’s obvious you’ll never go back to your old borders.

Meir: Never. And when I say never, it’s not because we mean to annex new territory. It’s because we mean to ensure our defense, our survival. If there’s any possibility of reaching the peace you spoke of in the beginning, this is the only way. There’d never be peace if the Syrians were to return to the Golan Heights, if the Egyptians were to take back the whole Sinai, if we were to re-establish our 1967 borders with Hussein. In 1967, the distance to Netanya and the sea was barely ten miles, fifteen kilometers, IF we give Hussein the possibility of covering those fifteen kilometers, Israel risks being cut in two and…They accuse us of being expansionist, but believe me, we’re not interested in expanding. We’re only interested in new borders. And look, these Arabs want to go back to the 1967 borders. IF those borders were the right ones, why did they destroy them?

Fallaci: But since the 1967 cease-fire, the war in the Middle East has taken on a new face: the face of terror, of terrorism. What do you think of this war and the men who are conducting it? Of Arafat, for instance, of Habash, of the Black September leaders?

Meir: I simply think they’re not men. I don’t even consider them human beings, and the worst thing you can say of a man is that he’s not a human being. It’s like saying he’s an animal, isn’t it? But how can you call what they’re doing “a war”? Don’t you remember what Habash said when he had a bus full of Israeli children blown up? “It’s best to kill the Isrealis while they’re still children.”

Can you imagine any Democrat leader in the U.S. speaking the truth as Meir did above? Back to Meir:

Come on, what they’re doing isn’t a war. It’s not even a revolutionary movement because a movement that only wants to kill can’t be called revolutionary. Look, at the beginning of the century in Russia, in the revolutionary movement that rose up to overthrow the czar, there was one party that considered terror the only means of struggle. One day a man from this party was sent with a bomb to a street corner where the carriage of one of the czar’s high officials was supposed to pass. The carriage went by at the expected time, but the official was not alone, he was accompanied by his wife and children.

So what did this true revolutionary do? He didn’t throw the bomb. He let it go off in his hand and was blown to pieces. Look, we too had our terrorist groups during the War of Independence: the Stern, the Irgun. And I was opposed to them, I was always opposed to them. But neither of them ever covered itself with such infamy as the Arabs have done with us. Neither of them ever put bombs in supermarkets or dynamite in school buses. Neither of them ever provoked tragedies like Munich or Lod airport.

Fallaci: And how can one fight such terrorism, Mrs. Meir? Do you really think it helps to bomb Lebanese villages?

Meir: …Maybe more than any other Arab country, Lebanon is offering hospitality to the terrorists. The Japanese who carried out the Lod massacre came from Lebanon, The girls who tried to hijack the Sabena plane in Tel Aviv had been trained in Lebanon. Are we supposed to sit here with our hands folded, praying and murmuring, “Let’s hope that nothing happens”? Praying doesn’t help. What helps is to counterattack. With all possible means, including means that we don’t necessarily like. Certainly we’d rather fight them in the open, but since that’s not possible…

The above Meir-Fallaci interview

Comment:

Response to President Donald Trump implementing the 1995 Jerusalem Embassy Act and recognizing Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel and initiating the process of relocating the American Embassy from Tel-Aviv to Jerusalem. Answer: we are the United States, we don't follow the rest of the world like sheep, we are going to support our greatest ally, and we're not going to take guidance from those who are allowing terrorists to run amok in their countries. If the rest of the world wants to cater to terrorists and allow them to manipulate, they can go ahead. The U.S. WON'T